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Misinformation making a disease outbreak worse: Examples for norovirus, influenza 
and monkeypox 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Health misinformation can exacerbate infectious disease outbreaks.  Especially pernicious advice could be 
classified as ‘fake news’: manufactured with no respect for accuracy and often integrated with emotive or 
conspiracy-framed narratives.  We built an agent-based model that simulated separate but linked circulating 
contagious disease and sharing of health advice (classified as useful or harmful).  Such advice had potential 
to influence human risk-taking behaviour and therefore risk of acquiring infection, especially as people are 
more likely in observed social networks to share bad advice.  We test strategies proposed in recent literature 
for countering misinformation.  Reducing harmful advice from 50% to 40% of circulating information, or 
making at least 20% of the population unable to share or believe harmful advice mitigated the influence of 
bad advice in the disease outbreak outcomes.  How feasible it is to try to make people “immune” to 
misinformation or control spread of harmful advice should be explored. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Previously we constructed an agent based model (ABM) 1, 2 about what could happen during a norovirus 
outbreak exacerbated by circulating misinformation (which we call ‘bad advice’).  Bad advice is relevant 
when it changes human behaviour to be more risky (= higher risk of getting disease).  Examples of possible 
risky behaviour can include not washing hands, sharing food with ill people, not disinfecting potentially 
contaminated surfaces or fomites, sneezing, coughing or vomiting in places where there is a high risk of 
spread onto food or surfaces, lack of disinfection and other unprotected physical contact with infectious 
persons or their bodily fluids. 
 
Some people in disease outbreak situations take few precautions to avoid getting disease, even when 
awareness of the outbreak is widespread and many official sources are widely disseminating information 
about how to avoid illness.  Compliance with quarantine protocols during a 2003 outbreak of SARS-
coronavirus was found to be uneven.  Compliance related to risk perception which in turn related to how 
trustworthy and credible sources of health advice were perceived to be, as well as difficulties respondents 
had in accepting parts of the situation they could not be in control of. 3  During a large and well publicised 
norovirus outbreak at a Canadian university, 25% of symptomatic students were observed to not avoid 
contacts, while 17% of the observed cohort did not comply with recommended handwashing practices 4.   In 
a 2019 survey in the UK 5, 14% of 2000 surveyed parents reported sending a child to school with symptoms 
of contagious chickenpox, violating school policies and official advice to quarantine such children.   
 
That misinformation can be linked to taking fewer measures to effectively prevent disease transmission is 
especially well documented with respect to Ebola viral disease (EVD).   For instance, persons affected by 
the West Africa outbreak (2013-2016) who believed other types of misinformation about EVD (eg., that it 
can be airborne or transmitted via mosquito bites) were more likely to report practicing unsafe burial 
practices.6  Low trust in institutions and more belief in EVD misinformation were associated with fewer 
preventive behaviours in the Congolese outbreak that started in 2018. 7  Following ineffective advice or 
disbelieving official recommendations often led to pursuing other self-care actions first and thus delayed 
actions that could reduce transmission (such as formally getting tested for EVD).8  Most sources that have 
studied disease-precaution behaviour, especially vaccine refusal (all diseases), note that cultural identity 
outside perceived mainstream society is strongly positively linked to tendency to reject expectations of 
‘good citizen behaviour’ 9-12, including disease avoidance actions recommended by public health authorities.  
 
Our objective was to model possible interactions between misinformation spread and disease outcomes.  The 
modelling was done within an agent-based modelling 13 environment, using Netlogo software 14.  Most 
model parameters were available from sources reporting actual human behaviour, such as about speed and 
  
frequency of social media and real life information sharing.   An ABM environment was attractive because it 
afforded many opportunities to include complex aspects of behaviour and response that might vary 
individually.  We use the term complex to distinctively mean processes that are thought to be inherently 
unpredictable and have uncertain outcomes (as opposed to the often misused near synonym complicated, 
which can be better interpreted as describing events that can be modelled using consistent albeit possibly 
very multifaceted decision trees).   
 
Complexity in our models meant that, for instance, clusters of individuals with frequent contact with each 
other (physical or information sharing contact) might have very different traits from the population averages.  
But these differences could not be consistently predicted; nor could location or encounters with other agents.  
Location and chances of getting disease or encountering misinformation were best estimated for our 
purposes using reiterative modelling and probabilistic distribution of relevant attributes.  These skewed traits 
could lead to localised hotspots or low activity zones of disease and/or information transmission.   Multiple 
types of feedback loops could be in operation that affected behaviour choices.  These feedback processes 
could be modelled at individual level using an ABM.  At the same time, many aspects of behaviour and 
response seemed likely to be probabilistic but perhaps on uncertain distributions or with unclear central 
tendency points.  The iterative nature of ABMs meant that we could try to use real world data to describe 
some behaviour aspects in the models, but also use iterations to estimate what some central values for other 
behaviour tendencies might be.   
 
In the ABM that we constructed, disease spread was via direct or indirect physical contact, while 
misinformation spread was via social contact, particularly within social groups (‘bubbles’).  These social 
groups were constructed to have relatively similar susceptibility for believing the misinformation. Members 
of one’s bubble were often the same persons that were physically encountered, so these could be the same 
people with whom it was likely that the disease could be exchanged.  Our initial work focused on norovirus 
because although very common, gastrointestinal illness is rarely modelled in individual infectious disease 
models 15.  Norovirus also had the advantage of being unlikely to cause flight or death (so those things could 
be defensibly not included in the model).  The incubation period is relatively short so travel outside the 
residence area was excluded.    
 
The purpose of this study is to adapt our misinformation (agent based) model to other communicable 
diseases and outbreak conditions. We compare results for norovirus, influenza and monkeypox 
(Orthopoxvirus).  The latter diseases can be substantially different from norovirus in many respects (such as 
mean incubation period) and are often not previously vaccinated for.   Influenza is an important 
communicable respiratory illness globally, while monkeypox is an emerging disease of high concern that 
has triggered biosecurity concerns 16, 17. 
  
 
These pathogens gave good opportunities to show that our modelling approach could be adapted to multiple 
types of disease and transmission risks. 
 
 
2. METHODS 
 
2.1 Overview 
 
Table 1 shows model assumptions and targets, separated by disease.  Model assumptions and design features 
such as rate of information injections are described in greater detail elsewhere 2.  The underlying Netlogo 
model code is available from the authors upon request.  At least 100 iterations were run for the most likely 
candidate thresholds or parameters to verify their reliability.  Extra simulations (above 100 minimum) were 
run until we found that additional model runs did not produce mean or median estimates that were any closer 
to the target conditions (i.e., a monotonic state in target outputs had been achieved).   
 
 
2.2 Stage 1 
 
A baseline stage 1 model was constructed for each circulating disease.  Target basic reproduction numbers 
(r0) were determined from consulting relevant literature for norovirus and influenza, and a likely maximum 
number of generations during a monkeypox outbreak (see Table 1).  The stage 1 models were designed to 
achieve the target r0 or number of generations.  Real life transmission of disease depends on multi-faceted 
factors: biological, social, structural and behavioural 18.  We conceptually break the risk of transmission 
down into three components: the probability of (1) infectious persons or (2) susceptible persons taking 
adequate precautions to avoid catching disease, as well as (3) viral shedding (which can be linked to 
pathogen and illness characteristics, not truly under individual control).  The involuntary shedding is 
separated from behavioural risks for many reasons.  It makes sense that a small part of the risk is purely 
biological not behavioural.  Separation lets individual behaviour be fully separated from involuntary 
shedding, while involuntary shedding may be adjusted to vary over the course of illness in future more 
sophisticated models (the amount of virus shed does vary with stage of illness in real infections 19). 
 
In a model run, during each time step and in a random direction, well agents move one step. Well agents 
move five times further than ill agents (who move 0.2 steps).  Each time step, susceptible agents near 
infectious agents were tested for possible disease transmission.  Disease was transmitted if neither side took 
sufficient precautions and viral shedding was sufficient for transmission.  Individuals had baseline take-
precautions (TP) % values assigned at the start of model runs.  TP is the percentage of the time that agents 
took effective precautions against catching disease.  TP did not vary in the stage 1 mode, but was important 
in stage 2-3 models when it could change in response to circulating (mis)information.  To establish the 
  
initial (baseline) stage 1 models, an exercise (described in the next paragraph) was undertaken to estimate 
the proportion of risk that could be attributed to and reserved for just viral shedding. 
 
TP was assigned to each individual agent, generated stochastically and assumed to have a normal 
distribution of values around the population mean, which was preset to 50% for several reasons.  
Constraining TP to range only between 0 and 1.0 (but with a fixed central population mean) gave TP the 
maximum room for change.  Also, prespecifying TP allowed us to estimate and specify separately the small 
proportion of risk of transmission that could be attributed to viral shedding alone (meant to be pathogen-
specific and due to presence of infection, not the risk of transmission due to agents’ good or poor behaviour 
choices).  Designating a small separate viral shed risk from behaviour seemed desirable because only with 
fairly extreme precautions (such as wearing personal protection equipment) could the risk of disease 
transmission be truly reduced to effectively zero.  The mechanism of disease transfer was: transmission 
could happen when susceptible and infectious agents were in close proximity and neither took high enough 
precautions to avoid transmission.   A small proportion of the risk was also linked to viral shedding for each 
disease.  The variations in how disease was transmitted (with and without a separate viral shedding risk) is 
helpful in showing that our modelling approach can be flexible and adapted for different disease or outbreak 
conditions. 
 
Table 1 lists other model parameters and assumptions.  1-2% of agents were infected at simulation start 
time.  Thereafter, agents moved around and tests were made about potentially transmitted disease each time 
step (one hour).  The model starts at 7am, and agents return ‘home’ to the same location each evening, 
which means the highest disease transmission risk is with others near their home location.   Agent density, 
grid size and movement rules were designed such that, in the absence of any disease, the daily contact rate 
with other agents averaged very close to 11.74 unique others/day (a target drawn from published UK contact 
rates in non-epidemic situations 20).  Empirically, we found that 1600 agents achieved the target contact rate, 
on a torus world shape (e.g.. going off the bottom meant re-entry at the top), with visible area measuring 
88x90 patches that agents could move around on.  Incubation periods, assumptions about shedding before or 
after illness, duration of active illness and infectious period and case fatality rates were drawn from relevant 
literature.  In Table 1, chances of hospitalisation or fatality were plausible, not meant to be definitive.  
Because health care in the UK is free at the point of use to and urgent care facilities are widely available, we 
assume that all very ill individuals will seek medical advice.  We assume that only very ill individuals will 
die from disease.  Therefore, the models assume that only hospitalised cases ever died and that no 
transmission occured after someone was hospitalised due to effective infection control measures.  Vaccine 
efficacy was assumed to be 100%, but vaccine availability varied by disease.  Uptake was assumed to be 
high but not universal (75% of those who could benefit).  Hospitalisation is the only form of quarantine 
considered. 
  
 
 
 TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
2.3 Stage 2 
 
The stage 2 model used the same disease and information circulating assumptions as the stage 1 model, but 
with exacerbation due to spread of misinformation that often reduced taking effective precautions (TP).  
Recall that the mean TP value was assigned randomly on a normal distribution with preset mean = 50% at 
start.  In stage 2, each exposure to misinformation changed individual TP, with limits at 0 and 100%.  The 
possible change in TP (ΔTP) was determined using repeated model runs, to achieve a 40% worse (higher) r0 
for norovirus or influenza, or more generations of transmission (from target 4 to target 7 in 75% of 
simulations) for monkeypox.  The magnitude of change in response to advice was equal whether good or 
bad advice 21-23.  ΔTP is the key response that individuals have to circulating information (or 
misinformation).  Exposure to ‘good’ advice increases taking precautions; exposure to bad advice decreases 
taking precautions. 
 
 
2.4 Social contacts and information sharing 
 
Each agent had a list of other agents that they might share information with (their own unique ‘information 
bubble’).  There were typically 80-230 members of this ‘bubble’ (mean number = 150, to conform with 
estimates of significant friendship circle sizes Dunbar numbers 24, 25).  The list of social contacts was created 
such that (on average) two-thirds of the social contacts had similar propensity (randomly assigned around 
population mean = 38.9%) to believe misinformation (from experimental and observation data, that typically 
members of the British public believe in an average 38.9% of conspiracy theories that they are exposed to 
26).  About 20% of social contacts were located near the agent’s home location; physical proximity made it 
more likely that disease would be shared with these specific same social contacts with whom 
(mis)information was shared. In every model run, agents moved around, potentially transmitted disease, and 
made decisions about whether to share information they had been exposed to.  Susceptible agents with lower 
TP values were at highest risk of acquiring infection.   
 
138 times per hour a single agent chosen at random was exposed to a piece of information and made a 
decision (stochastically) whether to share the information onwards to a small percentage (2.5%) of their 
social contacts.  The cascades of resulting information (number of times the information passed through 
unique sharers) were monitored and the model  performance in this regard is documented elsewhere 2.  The 
frequency of relevant information sharing and the likelihood of sharing advice were both determined 
empirically so that the resulting information cascades would conform with information sharing patterns 
reported recently on Twitter for true and false stories 27.  Distinguishing true from false (good and bad 
  
advice in our model) was important because false stories were observed to be four times more likely to be 
shared in the Twitter study.  In stage 2, the ratio of good:bad advice exposed to agents was 50:50. 
 
 
2.5 Stage 3: Intervention Strategies 
 
Proposed strategies to fight fake news from previous literature include:  
 
1) Provide counter-information that is equally or better evidenced, or more persuasive 28-34 
2) Tax the advertising or tax the profits of products sold via misinformation 35 
3) Drown bad info with good information 35 
4) Regulate information 33, possibly impose civil or criminal liabilities 29 which could lead to explicit 
censorship 29, 33 
5) Revise financial models available to fake news disseminators (incentives) to stop encouraging 
production and sharing of false (or even just very salaciously written) stories over truth and accuracy 
27, 34, 36-39 
6) Labelling (reliability rating or counter-arguments provided) by news provider 27, 29, 33, 34  
7) Encourage individuals to actively strive to make their own social filter bubbles more diverse 33 
8) “Immunise” recipients to disregard fake news (education-based strategy) 36, 40 
 
We do not model effects of intervention strategy 1 because the results are predictable; any changes will be 
linear responses if good advice increases without a reduction in bad advice or if good and bad advice are 
equally contagious.  Therefore, in stage 3, two strategies for reducing misinformation impacts were tested 
because their impacts could not be easily foreseen: 1) increasing the proportion of ‘good advice’ that 
encourages more protective behaviours, and 2) “immunising” individuals so that they do not respond or 
share bad advice.  Possible thresholds (to reduce the r0 from stage 2 to stage 1 values, or even lower) were 
explored both for the proportion misinformation adjustment and “immunisation” strategies.  Stage 3 models 
were run under stage 2 conditions but with the below modifications and objectives: 
 
 Stage 3.1: Reduce bad advice injections from 50% to a value that achieved conditions similar to 
our stage 1 models (stage 1 target r0 or number of generations), as well as stage 3.2 test what 
happened if only 10% of circulating advice is bad advice. 
 
 “Immunise” against bad information (but not immunised against the virus, and still able to react 
positively to good advice): a percentage of randomly selected agents were selected to be fully 
resistant (“immunised”) to bad advice.  The exact percentage was found empirically, such that 
(stage 3.3) the stage 1 r0 or number of generations was achieved. We also tested (stage 3.4) if 
  
“immunising” 90% of agents could reduce r0 below 1.0.  “Immunisation” also meant no sharing 
of bad advice.  This strategy simulated approaches that were based on education or diversifying 
social contacts (social filter bubbles). 
 
Statistical differences in the outcomes under each set of modelling assumptions were calculated using 
Wilcoxon rank sum tests using Stata v. 16.0 (stage 1 was the reference condition). 
 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
Table 2 shows estimated viral shed risk values found to consistently get closest to target r0s in stage 1 
models, when mean TP = 50%, and the change in TP (ΔTP) required upon each information exposure to 
raise the r0 by 40% (stage 2 models). Table 3 shows model run results (r0, duration of outbreak, final attack 
rate and prevalence of disease at peak) for each separate disease. Supplemental files S1-S3 show additional 
results for alternative model parameters.  For all diseases, reducing bad advice from 50% to 40% of all 
relevant circulating advice changed stage 2 outbreak conditions to stage 1 levels.  Similarly, making 20-25% 
of individuals “immune” to believing or sharing bad advice changed stage 2 outbreak outcomes back to 
stage 1 levels (with respect to r0 or number of generations of transmission, duration of outbreak, peak attack 
rate, case fatality rate or final total attack rate). 
 
We find it interesting to note that even if the strategies are applied relatively drastically and effectively (i.e., 
quite large reductions in proportion of bad advice circulating or high percentage “immunised” against bad 
advice), disease spread was not stopped.  The results in Table 3 suggest that even if bad advice were only 
10% of circulating advice (stage 3.2), r0 for norovirus and influenza may reach 1.0, while number of 
generations of transmission for monkeypox will be ≥ 3 in at least 25% of simulations.  Similarly, even if 
90% of agents are “immune” to bad advice (stage 3.4), outbreak r0 (norovirus and influenza) will tend to be 
≥ 1.0 and at least 25% of outbreaks will have ≥ 3 generations of transmission.  The Wilcoxon rank sum tests 
(Table 3) show that broadly, outcomes were similar between stage 1 models and stage 3.1 and 3.3 models 
(which was the objective).  Stage 2, 3.2 and 3.4 model outcomes were quite different from stage 1 models 
(most p values well below 0.01). 
 
 TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
 TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
  
No previous studies have integrated information spread with disease spread to the level of sophistication that 
we have done.  Prior models often considered information spread in disease outbreak development, but 
information awareness was typically equally available to all agents, and benign at worst.  Thus, information 
spread in the models nearly always led to greater protective measures (such as increasing vaccine uptake or 
decreasing contact rates 41-50).  Most previous similar disease and awareness spread models had awareness 
increases that could only happen following physical contact or as a result of global conditions 42, 45, 48, 50-55.  
Our modelling is unusual because information spread was individual and separated from the physical 
interactions that could transmit disease.  Our model is unique and original in attempting to consider the 
potentially deleterious role of information sharing with stochastic and individually assigned elements.  The 
need for research such as ours has been recognised before 17, 56.  
 
 
More sophisticated information sharing networks than we tried to create could make these models more 
credible.  There exist more sophisticated models on rumour spread that we could possibly replicate for the 
information spreading process 57-59, and simultaneously merge with existing sophisticated disease spread 
models.  More ambitious models than ours would describe more agents and more complicated movement 
patterns, such as including flight as a behaviour option.  Many rumour spreading models have borrowed 
ideas and methods from epidemiological models 60, 61; but not many (if any) previous models have integrated 
both rumour and disease spread as separate but interacting processes into one unified probabilistic model. 
 
This study describes spread of three viral diseases; misinformation affecting spread of bacterial diseases 
could be modelled equally well.  The ideas could be applied to non-communicable diseases and health 
outcomes, but would need to change the time scale to be much longer to model chronic and lifestyle diseases 
and how their incidence might change in response to circulating misinformation.  A much longer time scale 
would mean incorporating many other lifestyle factors into the models. 
 
Model construction relied heavily on a small number of existing studies about such factors as number of 
contact rates, social contacts (i.e.., Dunbar numbers), how much bad or good advice can change behaviour, 
and the propensity to believe in misinformation (the finding that on average, British people believe in 38.9% 
of conspiracy theories that they are exposed to).  More reliably estimating any of these and many of the 
other factors would also increase the credibility of our results. Our threshold for a ‘worse’ outbreak situation 
was r0 being 40% worse or number of generations of disease transmission increased from 4 to 7; these 
thresholds were decided for convenience in this set of demonstration models. 
 
Given our definition of stage 2 as an outbreak ‘made worse by circulating misinformation’, stage 3.1 
modelling concluded for all three diseases that a ratio of about 60:40 good:bad advice circulating would 
  
reduce the stage 2 conditions to those of stage 1.  The models also suggested that “immunising” about 20% 
of the population against misinformation was likely to revert stage 2 to stage 1 conditions (for all diseases, 
stage 3.3). Since these apparent consistencies could be artefacts of shared model design, tests to explore the 
true consistency of these findings for multiple diseases would be worthwhile.  It is possible that more 
sophisticated, detailed or larger models or more flexible modelling software 62 would facilitate better 
insights into risk distributions and behaviour choices. 
 
There is uncertainty in the reliability of these findings because the models are experimental and have not 
been tested in real world situations.  There is a general lack of reliable quantification for how much 
misinformation spread impacts real life risk-taking behaviour with regard to communicable diseases. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We applied three stages of modelling (1 = no misinformation spread, 2 = misinformation making outbreaks 
worse and 3 = strategies to reduce the influence of misinformation).  Our modelling approach and design is 
adaptable to many different types of diseases.  Controlling spread of misinformation or susceptibility to it 
could reduce communicable disease burdens.  Our stage 3.1 modelling found that a ratio of about 60:40 
good:bad circulating advice reduced stage 2 conditions to those of stage 1 in three types of disease.  
“Immunising” about 20% of the population against misinformation (stage 3.3) was likely to revert stage 2 to 
stage 1 conditions (for all diseases).  The feasibility of implementing these types of strategies 
(“immunisation” or changing the proportions of types of advice in circulation) should be explored.  The 
efficacy of implementing such strategies to fight ‘fake news’ needs to be tested in real world settings, with 
costs and benefits ideally compared with real world disease reduction. 
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S1: Additional results for Influenza 
S2: Additional results for Monkeypox 
S3: Additional results for Norovirus 
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Table 1. Model assumptions and targets (stage 1) 
 
 Norovirus Influenza Monkeypox 
Model baseline target  
r0  or generations 
r0=1.9 63 r0=1.47 64 Insufficient data to 
estimate r0 65  but assume 
75% outbreaks have ≤ 4 
generations of p2p 
transmission 66 
 
Targets in stage 2  
(worse r0 or gen’s) 
 
r0=2.66 r0=2.06 Increase to 75% outbreaks 
have ≤ 7 generations 
 
% agents who start 
model ill (infectious) 
 
2% 2% 1% 
Incubation period? 36 hours (mean) 
67, 68 
48 hrs (mean), range 
1-4 days  
SD = 0.5 d 69 
12d (mean)  70  
(range 7-17d) 
    
Viral shedding pre-
illness? 
Assumed none Yes: 1 day before 
illness starts 
 
Assumed none 
Viral shedding post-
illness? 
 
Mean 48 hours Only if illness < 6 
days 
Assumed none 
Infectious period while 
ill 
Entire duration 
of illness 71-73 
 
First 6 days (mean) 
after symptoms 
onset, or until no 
longer ill (if < 6 
days)  69 
 
Entire duration of illness 
Duration of illness 46 hours  
71-73 
7 days, with  
SD = 1.75 day 69 
21d (mean)  70 (range 14-
28d) 
 
Chances of 
hospitalisation  
0% 5%/d (when ill) 70%/d (only after 4d) 
 
 
Case fatality rate  
 
0% 67 
 
0.65% 74 
Low because assumed 
high income country 
setting, 1-2% 75 
 
Vaccination available No After 5 months 76 After 18 wks  77 
 
Vaccination efficacy Not applicable 100% if not 
incubating 78 
100% if < 4d after 
exposure, else 0 77 
 
Vaccination uptake All those with TP > 25th percentile of TP% & susceptible (or 
incubating < 4 days if monkeypox) 
 
Model tests relevant to 
disease transmission  
If neither side takes enough precautions AND viral shed risk is high 
enough 
 
Notes: CFR = Case fatality rate; p2p = person to person.  Targets are from literature (influenza pandemics 
after 2009).  The CFR for monkeypox is plausible 65 but there is lack of data from high income country 
  
settings.  Model assumes that no shortage of vaccine (once available, there is always enough to meet 
demand). Delay in influenza is for production timeline; delay in monkeypox vaccine is for time to procure 
supply and to recognise need.
  
Table 2.  Performance metrics and results to generate stage 1-2 models.  
 
 Norovirus Influenza Monkeypox 
Stage 1.  Proportion of transmission risk 
due to viral shedding  
(5-95th percentiles for linked r0) 
8.3% 
 
(1.75-2.06) 
3.6%  
 
(1.27-1.58) 
0.8% 
 
(0-0.53) 
    
Stage 1.  Mean case fatality rate % 
(CFR, 5-95th percentiles) 
n/a 0.70% 
(0.42-1.03%) 
1.04% 
(0-2.93%) 
    
Stage 2. ΔTP value required to 
consistently increase r0 or gens 
(5-95th percentiles for linked r0) 
1.9% 
 
(2.44-2.89) 
1.05% 
 
(1.78-2.32) 
1.1% 
 
(0-0.89) 
    
Stage 2. Mean case fatality rate % 
(CFR, 5-95th percentiles) 
n/a 0.62% 
(0.42-1.14%) 
1.39% 
(0-1.68%) 
 
Note: CFR = case fatality rate; gens = generations. These values most closely enabled 
meeting the r0 or #generations targets (in Table 1).  Values in () are range of r0 or CFR, 5th to 
9th percentiles, over ≥ 100 simulations.  More detailed results are in supplemental 
information. 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3. Stage 1 (no sharing), stage 2 (outbreak exacerbated by bad advice), and stage 3 (results with intervention strategies).  Mean values for 
given outbreak characteristics, with 5-95th percentiles to indicate range without the most extreme values.  
 
Stage 1 No circulating advice     
 r0 or #gens Duration (weeks) Final Attack Rate Peak attack rate Case fatality rate 
Norovirus 1.90 (1.75-2.06) 9.4 78.6% 8.6% n/a 
Influenza 1.46 (1.27-1.58) 13.6 59.2% 14.0% 0.70% 
Monkeypox 75thperc #gens = 4 7.3 1.3% 0.98% 1.04% 
      
Stage 2. Circulating advice makes outbreak worse, r0 increased by 40% or #gens from 4 to 7.  Good:Bad advice ratio is still 50:50 
 r0 or #gens Duration (weeks) Final Attack Rate Peak attack rate Case fatality rate 
Norovirus 2.66 (2.44-2.89)** 8.7** 91.8%** 10.7%** n/a 
Influenza 2.08 (1.78-2.32) ** 14.9** 82.7%** 18.2%** 0.62%** 
Monkeypox 75thperc #gens = 7 9.9 2.2% 1.2% 1.39%** 
      
Stage 3.1 Strategies to reduce impacts of circulating bad advice in Stage 2 conditions: Ratio advice needed to revert to stage 1 r0 or #gens 
 Good:Bad advice ratio Duration (weeks) Final Attack Rate Peak attack rate Case fatality rate 
Norovirus 59:41* 9.2 79.2%* 8.9% n/a 
Influenza 60:40 14.4 59.0% 13.4% 0.73% 
Monkeypox 61:39 7.1 7.3% 1.0% 1.33% 
      
Stage 3.2 Stage 2 conditions, but if Good:Bad advice ratio is 90:10  
 r0 or #gens Duration (weeks) Final Attack Rate Peak attack rate Case fatality rate 
Norovirus 0.99 (0.95-1.03)** 3.9** 21.1%** 3.9%** n/a 
Influenza 0.88 (0.76-0.99) ** 5.1** 12.8%** 5.0%** 0.74%** 
Monkeypox 75thperc #gens = 3** 5.6** 1.2%* 1.0% 0.96% 
      
Stage 3.3: Stage 2 conditions, what % of agents need to be “immunised” against bad advice, needed to revert to stage 1 r0 or #gens 
 % “immunised” Duration (weeks) Final Attack Rate Peak attack rate Case fatality rate 
Norovirus 20% 9.3 78.5% 8.9% n/a 
  
Influenza 22.5% 15.2** 59.6% 13.1%* 0.42% 
Monkeypox 20-40% 6.9-8.4 1.3-1.5% 0.98-1.04% 0.86-1.34% 
      
Stage 3.4: Stage 2 conditions, but if 90% of agents are “immunised”   
 r0 or #gens Duration (weeks) Final Attack Rate Peak attack rate Case fatality rate 
Norovirus 1.11 (1.03-1.22)** 5.0** 31.6%** 4.8%** n/a 
Influenza 1.02 (0.88-1.13) ** 7.1** 22.4%** 7.5%** 0.15%** 
Monkeypox 75thperc #gens = 3* 5.6* 1.2% 1.0% 0.96% 
 
Note: “immunised” means acquired perfect resistance against believing or sharing bad advice, rather than inability to catch norovirus, influenza 
or monkeypox. 75th perc #gens = the 75th percentile value (among all eligible simulations) for number of disease transmission generations; 75% 
of simulations had this number or fewer transmissions.  Statistical significance: Wilcoxon rank sum tests with stage 1 outcomes as reference: ** 
means p < 0.01, while * means 0.01 < p < 0.05. 
 
